In this paper a model of wage determination and interfirm mobility decisions is exposited and estimated. The theoretical model is essentially a discrete time version of Jovanovic's worker-firm matching model.
Wage and Job Mobility of Young Workers
INTRODUCTION
It is a well-established empirical regularity that the probability of leaving a job is a decreasing function of a worker's tenure at a firm (see Jovanovic, 1978 , Ch. 1, for a detailed review of empirical work on turnover). One explanation advanced is that the accumulation of firmspecific human capital makes a job change costlier for workers with more experience at a given firm (see, e.g., Becker [1962] , Rosen [1968] , Parsons [1972] , and Kuratani [1973] ). Another explanation for the tenure-turnover relationship is that there exists a productivity effect intrinsic to the match of a worker and a firm. While all agents are assumed to know the parameters of the distribution of this matching heterogeneity, the value of a particular match is only partially observable to both the worker and firm. The longer an employment spell continues, the more precise is the estimate of the value of the match. As a consequence of this learning process, turnover is more likely to occur at low tenure levels.
That worker-firm heterogeneity may be an important factor in the explanation of turnover was recognized by Silcock (1954) . Jovanovic (1978) was the first to establish the form of equilibrium wage contracts and turnover decision rules for a matching model formulated in continuous time. Wilson (1980) has solved for equilibrium wage policies in a model that includes both matching heterogeneity and job search. Other nonequilibrium models that generate turnover are those of Wilde (1980) , Johnson (1978) , Burdett (1978) , and Lippman and McCall (1978) . In Burdett's model some employed individuals search and when superior offers arrive leave their current firm. Johnson's model of job shopping is essentially a two-period, two-firm, discrete time version of Jovanovic's model. The simplicity of his model allows him to obtain a number of comparative static results. In the models of Wilde and Lippman and McCall, workers learn a characteristic of the job only after accepting employment. If the value of this characteristic is sufficiently low, the worker quits.
The purpose of this research is to empirically assess the quantitative importance of worker-firm matching heterogeneity in explaining interfirm mobility and wage determination. The model of turnover and wage determination discussed and estimated in this paper is similar to those of Jovanovic (1978) and Johnson (1978) . It is set in discrete time, as is the job-shopping model of Johnson, and assumes infinitely lived agents, as does Jovanovic. 1 In order to focus attention on the worker-firm matching process, we ignore firm-specific human capital accumulation in what follows. The introduction of firm-specific human capital greatly complicates the form of the turnover decision rule, and may produce a policy function which does not possess the reservation value property. For the theoretical model to provide any guidelines for our econometric specification, the turnover decision must possess the reservation value property.
A note on the organization of the paper. In Section 2 we state the nature of the worker's utility maximization problem, the content of the worker's information set, and establish that the worker's turnover deci-3 worker's information set, and establish that the worker's turnover decision possesses the reservation value property. In Section 3 we discuss the data employed in the empirical analysis and present some descriptive statistics. Section 4 contains a discussion of the problem of obtaining initial consistent estimators for estimable structural parameters in the model. For the matching model presented here, some of the parameters are nonparametically underidentified, in the terminology of Flinn and Heckman (1982b) . In Section 5 we obtain maximum likelihood estimates of the identifiable structural parameters after making specific distributional assumptions. Section 6 contains a brief conclusion.
Finally, a note on some of the inadequacies of the treatment of turnover in this paper. Because the focus of this work is primarily empirical, the approach taken here is a decidedly nonequilibrium one. 2
Firms are assumed to be passive agents in all that follows. The rents that accrue to the match are either entirely captured by the worker or divided between worker and firm in some constant proportion. 3 Only permanent separations are considered, and due to the passive firm assumption, all quits are voluntary.4 Wages are assumed to be the only job attribute of value to the worker.
TURNOVER DECISIONS IN A WORKER-FIRM MATCHING MODEL
Workers are assumed to be infinitely lived, with entry into the labor market occurring at t=O (a normalization where Wit is the value of the i th agent's problem at time t, Cit is the consumption of agent i at time t, S is the time invariant discount factor, and W ijt is the wage rate of agent i at firm j at time t. The conditional expectation operator E t denotes expectation taken with respect to information available at the end of period t-1. Workers are constrained to consume all earnings during the period in which they are received.
At this point we make several functional form assumptions which conAssume that U(c. ) = .l!.n c. and l.t l.t substitute the budget constraint into the objective function to get where the j subscript indexes firms in the agent's choice set, and assumes values j = 1,2, ••• , J. We assume that all agents possess the same choice set, and that the set of firms is large but finite. The subscript jk denotes the firm in which individual i is working at date k.
The maximization procedure will be made explicit below. The maximization procedure may now be described. Since individuals capture the rents which accrue to the worker-firm match, workers will attempt to locate the firm at which their value of 8 .. is largest. The 1J constraints on worker "searching" are the following:
1) There may exist a direct cost of finding a new employer or terminating a current match. Denote this direct cost by C(C~0).
2) Once a worker leaves a firm he may not return to the firm (no recall). Less stringently, we may assume that a worker who returns to a previous employer draws a new match value (8) independent of the previous value realized at the firm.
3) All firms look alike ex ante to workers. The value of the match of worker i to firm j provides no information as to the expected , value of the match of worker i with firm j , j * j. This has already implicitly been assumed above, but we restate it here since it has a direct bearing on the form of the worker's decision rule. Formally, Define the precision of e and E by TIe and TIE respectively, where
At the beginning of period t, the agent's decision to change employers will depend on his point estimate of the quality of his match with his current employer, qijt, and the precision of the point estimate,
hijt. Due to the normality assumptions, the worker's posterior distribution of eij is characterized by these two quantities. For simplicity we drop the subscripts on q and h for the remainder of this section. Let q' be the updated point estimate of q given one additional observation of r on the current job; let h' similarly denote the updated precision of the sequentially revised point estimate q'. The relationships between these quantities are given by the well-known expressions (e.g., DeGroot, 1970) :
h+TI . E When a worker accepts employment with a new firm, the initial values of q and hare 0 and TIe respectively. The process of updating begins from these values for all new employers. One more observation is needed before deriving the turnover decision rule; given a current estimate of the match value q with precision h, the marginal distribution of the next observation r' is normal with mean q and variance (h + TI e )/ bITE.
Since the posterior distribution of the match value can be characterized by the mean and precision, the worker's mobility decision at each time t will only be a function of the current values of these two state variables. To investigate properties of the decision rule, first assume a finite horizon with terminal date T. We can write the T period value function as (2.4) VT(q,h) = max {q;O}.
Obviously, V T is increasing in q and is independent of the precision h.
No matter what the value of h, the turnover decision rule is a simple one: stay with the current employer if q~0; leave the current employer
The reservation value at T is given by qT(h) = qT = 0.
The period T -1 value function is 2) where x is the previous point estimate, y is the previous precision, and z is the new observation on r which is a random variable.
We may establish that VT-l is increasing in q by observing the following. The second argument in the maximization operator is a constant independent of q, therefore we only need to establish that the first argument is increasing in q. This amounts to showing that (Z.6) h + ITe:
is increasing in q. Since VT is increasing in q'(q,h,<jJ) and q'(q,h,<jJ) is increasing in q, then VT (q , (q, h, <jJ), h') is increasing in q for all <j J • But increases in q also affect the distribution of <jJ. Consider ql > qZ. for all oR, belonging to the class of increasing functions. Since VT is a member of this class, the two effects of increasing q both act to increase (Z.6). Thus we have shown that increases in q increase the first argument in the max operator in (Z.5), which establishes VT-l increasing in q.
Now consider the effects of increases in the precision h on VT-l.
Once again the second term in the max operator of (Z.5) is independent of h, as is the expected current period return at the current employer.
Increases in h only affect VT-l through the term reproduced in (Z.5). As before we first examine the effect of increases in h on EVT, ignoring effects changes in h induce on the distribution of <jJ. Consider hl > hZ, and compare JVT(q'(q, hl, <jJ), hl + ITddS(<jJ I q,b) and JVT(q'(q,hZ, <jJ), hZ + ITe:)dS(<jJ 'q,b). Since VT is independent of the precision h in the last period, we need only consider the effect of changes in h on the q' function. Note that q' is a random variable, with
where expectation is taken with respect to dS(~I q,b). The conditional variance of q' is given by
Then decreases in h correspond to increases in the variance of the random variable qt. Since the mean of q' is not a function of hand q' is nor- amount to conducting a MPS directly on~, which must increase the value of the problem. We have shown that decreases in h will increase the value of expression (Z.6), and therefore VT-l is decreasing in h. This analysis may be repeated inductively for VT-2, VT-3, "', VI, and we establish h + TIE = max{q + S!Vt+1(q'(q, h, </», h')dS(</> I q, hIT );
lIe lIE is increasing in q for t = 1, ' •• , T and is decreasing in h for t 1,
Using these monotonicity properties of V t we can construct reservat ion value functions q~(h) for t = 1, "., T. We have already * * discussed qT(h) above. These qt(h) are solutions of the implicit function lIe + lIE -c + S!V t +1(q'(O, lIe, </», lIe + IIE)dS(</> 1°, ).
lIe lIE Since V t is decreasing in h, the workers at matches with large h must have higher values of q to induce them to stay at the firm. Then q~ (h) is an increasing function. For a worker who has been with the current firm for d periods, h = lIe + dII E , so h is an increasing function of d.
The longer the duration of the match, the higher must be the conditional mean q for the worker not to leave the match. By the boundedness assumptions and the existence of a discount factor Se(O,l), we have sufficient conditions for the optimal value function of the T horizon problem to converge to the optimal value of the infinite horizon problem. Write this function as Virtually all models of turnover, both theoretical and empirical, posit a relation between the current period mobility decision and past labor market experiences. !n the matching model considered in this paper, the turnover decision rule contains as arguments statistics which are functions of the wage history on the current job. If only a portion of that history is actually observed, estimation of structural parameters is greatly complicated by the existence of initial conditions problems. 7
Differences in initial conditions across individuals may often be misinterpreted as reflecting individual differences in tastes and technology (which is conventionally defined as unobserved heterogeneity). The distinction between these two types of heterogeneity is important if we are to obtain consis'tent estimates of structural parameters.
To circumvent the initial conditions problem,8 the subsample (hereafter referred to as the "sample") was selected in the following manner. As of the first wave of the panel (1966) all sample members were enrolled in full-time schooling and reported themselves as not being full-time members of the labor force. At each of the interview dates in 1967, 1968, and 1969 , the sample members were holding full-time jobs and Their usage presumably minimizes the effects of differences in initial conditions on the structural estimates obtained. On the other hand, we should be cautious in drawing inferences concerning the nature of the mobility and wage growth process for young workers from structural estimates using this sample.
There were 248 individuals who satisfied all of the selection criteria. The model described in Section 2 implies a number of restrictions on the form of the dynamic wage equations and the turnover decision rule.
The following sections discuss estimation of structural parameters using our theoretical formulation, but at this point it seems desirable to test some of these restrictions using a fairly general econometric framework.
Consider the following two-equation system: a j is the intercept term for mobility group j in year k, k j is the coefficient vector for mobility group j in year k, X k and (~il ,~iZ) are disturbances. While the random variables n, e, and E were assumed to be normally distributed in Section 2,~i1, and~i2
will not be normally distributed after selection on e and E has taken place. Thus we test the restrictions of the model using the minimum distance estimator described in Chamberlain (1982 , ,
A where Q == asymptotic covariance matrix of /I' (~- §.), I is the number of , individuals,~i = (~n w i1~n w i2 ) , X. is a k x 1 vector of observed heterogeneity components at time t, and~t a is a conformable parameter matrix.
We tested several linear restrictions on coefficients in §. using (3.1) under both sets of assumptions A and B in (3.2). Since both sets of assumptions resulted in the same inference concerning rejection or nonrejection of restri~tions, we report results of tests using the assumptions contained in A. The general strategy used in nesting the tests was to first test restrictions on the coefficient vector yj and k then move to the intercept terms a~.
We first tested the restriction that the coefficient vectors for movers and stayers were time invariant, though they were allowed to depend on mobility status. This restriction appears in line 1 of expec~.,..._ This restriction also produced a relatively small distance statistic. There is no strong empirical evidence to suggest that the coefficient vector r is not time invariant, and conditional on time invariance, is not independent of mobility status.
We then proceed to test restrictions on the intercept terms. By the theory, the intercept terms for the firm-changers should increase substantially between periods one and two. The intercept term for individuals who do not change may also increase through the accumulation of general human capital. In line 4 of Table 3 we impose the restriction of time invariance of the intercept terms of the mover and stayer groups.
This restriction is overwhelmingly rejected. In lines 3a and 3b we test the time invariance restrictions one at a time. Although the restriction is violated for both movers and stayers, rejection is by far the clearest for the group of movers.
M
Lastly, in line 5, we test equality of a and as conditional on time invariance of the intercepts. This restriction is also decisively rejected.
We conclude this section by considering the sensitivity of parameter estimates with respect to alternative assumptions regarding the linearity of the conditional expectation function and heteroskedasticity of the disturbances. Equation (3.1) was estimated under assumptions A and B in (3.2) and imposing time and mobility status invariance on Y? Thẽr esults appear in Table 4 . It seems reasonable to claim that the parameter estimates are relatively insensitive to the assumptions made.
For the purpose of obtaining point estimates, nonlinearity of the conditional expectation function and heteroskedasticity do not appear to be important considerations in this particular application.
INITIAL CONSISTENT ESTII1ATES OF STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS
All structural parameters which are potentially identifiable can be consistently estimated using only the first two years of data for the sample described in the previous section. To reduce the computational burden (particularly in obtaining maximum likelihood estimates), we will restrict our analysis to these two periods. Obtaining initial consistent estimates can serve at least two useful purposes for this analysis.
First, they constitute good starting values for the subsequent maximum likelihood estimation. It is also the case that taking one Newton step from the initial consistent estimates produces estimates which are asymptotically efficient. Thus for computationally demanding models we may wish to perform only one iteration to achieve asymptotically efficient It is straightforward to obtain initial consistent estimates of the parameter vector X. In the specification considered here, X includes an intercept term, the number of years of schooling completed, the indicator variable for the race of the individual, and the individual's age. We can obtain consistent estimates of X from the regression of the log of the first period wage rate on these regressors. No systematic selection
has as yet taken place, and the estimate of the intercept term is unbiased. The results of the OLS regression are:
.031 S -(2.176)
.134 Black + .052 A67 (2.239) (4.047)
. ,
where the absolute value of the t-statistic appears in parentheses.
We make all the assumptions concerning the first and second moments and the orthogonality of n, 6, and e: that were made in Section 2. We immediately proceed to a specification of the first and second period wage equations for movers and stayers. The log wage equations for job changers are
The log wage equations for stayers are Again, by the orthogonality assumptions, ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimates from the first period log wage equation are consistent esti-
mates 0 X. n estimate of tota van.at on aT = an + as + as. is given by We can obtain an estimator of the sum as + as in the following manner. For all movers (isM), change in log wage is
After replacing y with y in (4.2), we get that an initial consistent 2 2 estimate of as + a 2 is
Using these two estimates, an estimate of a is n (4.4) 2 2 2
We obtain estimates of as + a and a of .092 and .058, respectively. We e n now turn to the issue of identifying a~and a; separately.
Due to the information structure of the model, it is not possible to
separate y 1 ent1 y as an a e W1t out t e 1mpos1t on 0 speC1 1C istributional assumptions. In the language of Flinn and Heckman (1982b) , aã nd a 2 are nonparametrically underidentified. Since the matching model e is developed for the case in which the stochastic terms Sand e are normally distributed, we adopt this assumption at this point.
The second period log wage equation for stayers has expected value " * 
The LHS of (4.6) and (4.7) are consistently estimated by the mean of first period OLS residuals for the mover and stayer groups, respectively.
Since a consistent estimate of (J is available, it is possible to solve v * (4.6) and (4.7) for two estimates of q1 (both consistent under the criteria by which we may choose between these estimates, this procedure is mainly useful for computational purposes. Anyone of these estimates may be used as starting values to guarantee consistency of the maximum likelihood estimator described in the next section.
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF THE MATCHING MODEL
In this section we present maximum likelihood estimates of the identifiable structural parameters. In general, we are not able to identify the mobility cost parameter C and the discount factor S. While it is possible to map out a locus of equiprobable pairs (C, S), there exists no extraneous information which allows us to choose a particular pair (although we would want to restrict estimates to the region of the plane in which C~0, 0~S < 1). It is possible to compute fully efficient , 2 2 2 maximum likelihood estimates for (X ' G n , G e , G e ) =r in a relatively straightforward manner. We will only concern ourselves with estimating the parameter vector £ in this paper.
The stochastic structure is assumed to be of the form: (0 ,.,,2) ni~N ,v n v· .
J.,J and all stochastic components are assumed to be pairwise orthogonal for all subsets of relevant indices from {i,j,t}.
Once again we use only the first two periods of observations. The dependent variables of the analysis consist of log wages in periods one and two and the interfirm mobility indicator for the 1967-68 period. The joint probability function of wages and mobility conditional on observed heterogeneity is k(Wijl, Wij'Z, miZ I~il,~iZ, I). Rewrite the joint probability function as
here k l is the bivariate density of log wages conditional on mobility status and k Z is the marginal probability of mobility.
By the reservation value property established in Section Z and the information structure of the problem, we know that observed turnover be- 
In the ILF for the movers (5.5), the conditional density of first period wages has a truncated normal form. The conditional density 2 which is a normal density with mean Z'lY + n. and variance as + a. Sõ
that the final form of (5.5)' is Table 5 . In comparison with the consistent estimates of X which were used as starting values in the maximization of fer), only the OLS and ML estimates of the schooling coefficient differ appreciably. The ML estimate of the schooling coefficient is extremely small and only marginally significant. The ML -150.082 estimate of the age coefficient is large relative to the OL8 estimate and highly significant.
Given the structure of the stochastic term assumed in this paper, it is possible to assess the proportion of variability in log wages of new labor market entrants due to n, 8, and E. In the first period, .44 of the total variability is attributable to individual specific, time and job invariant heterogeneity, .38 is due to worker-firm specific heterogeneity, and the remainder to white noise. As a cohort (defined in terms of date of labor market entrance) ages, the proportion of log wage X variability attributable to worker-firm heterogeneity will decline as individuals sort into acceptable matches. 9 Thus .38 represents an upper bound on the proportion of variance attributable to match specific factors.
CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated that worker-firm matching heterogeneity is an important factor in the explanation'of wage variation among recent labor market entrants. This suggests that the stochastic structure of earnings may differ substantially between groups characterized by different mobility patterns. Econometric models of earnings dynamics which do not incorporate the mobility decision may be seriously misspecified if the sample includes a significant proportion of recent labor market entrants.
We should not overstate the importance of matching heterogeneity as an explanation of turnover. When a firm is first sampled, the individual's prior on 8 ij has variance .068. After one period (one pro-ductivity realization), the variance associated with the estimate of e is reduced to .021. After two realizations, it is further reduced to .013.
Most of the uncertainty as to the value of the match is resolved in the first two periods of employment. Thus, matching heterogeneity may be an important explanation of terminations of brief worker-firm attachments, but does not promise to be useful in explaining separations at tenure levels greater than three or four years, at least as currently formulated. Footnotes 1This assumption is not strictly necessary, but is made for simplicity. Johnson makes the assumption that agents only live for two periods, which is overly restrictive for our purposes.
2The demand side of the market cannot be addressed empirically, because virtually all currently available data sets are supply side oriented, i.e., the unit of analysis is the individual.
3The division of these rents is obviously an important issue, which has recently been addressed by Mortensen (1978) . 61nterviews were also completed in subsequent years, but these occurred at intervals greater than one year and tended to be less comprehensive.
7For a discussion of the ramifications of initial conditions problems in the context of two different econometric models for the analysis of panel data, see Heckman (1981) , and Flinn and Heckman (1982a) . 80f course the time at which an individual leaves full-time schooling and enters the labor market is determined by market conditions and personal characteristics. This endogeneity is ignored in our "solution" to the initial conditions problem.
9Given that e and E are normally distributed.
